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The  relationship  between  the  conscious  experience  of  physical  symptoms  and  indicators  of  objective
physiological  dysfunction  is  highly  variable  and  depends  on characteristics  of  the person,  the  context
and  their  interaction.  This  relationship  often  breaks  down  entirely  in  the  case  of “medically  unexplained”
or  functional  somatic  symptoms,  violating  the basic  assumption  in  medicine  that physical  symptoms
have  physiological  causes.  In this  paper,  we  describe  the  prevailing  theoretical  approach  to  this  problem
and  review  the  evidence  pertaining  to it.  We  then  use  the framework  of predictive  coding  to propose  aymptom perception
edically unexplained symptoms
redictive coding
new and more  comprehensive  model  of the  body-symptom  relationship  that  integrates  existing  concepts
within  a unifying  framework  that  addresses  many  of  the  shortcomings  of current  theory.  We  describe
the  conditions  under  which  a  close  correspondence  between  the  experience  of symptoms  and  objective
physiology  might  be expected,  and  when  they  are  likely  to diverge.  We  conclude  by exploring  some
theoretical  and  clinical  implications  of this  new  account.
© 2017  Elsevier  Ltd. All  rights  reserved.ontents
1. The  disease  model  and  medically  unexplained  symptoms  . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . . .  .  .  . . . .  .  . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  . .  .  . . . . .  186
1.1.  Extent  and  varieties  of MUS  .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  .  186
1.2.  Somatosensory  ampliﬁcation  and  misattribution  . . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . .  .  . .  .  .  . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  187
1.2.1.  Peripheral  arousal  and  stress-related  physiology  . . . .  . . . .  .  . . . .  . .  . . . . . . .  . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . .  .  .  .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . 187
1.2.2. Interoceptive  hypervigilance,  thresholds  and  awareness  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  .  . . .  . .  .  . . . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . .  . .  . .  . .  .  . . .  189
1.2.3.  Misattribution  and interpretation  bias  .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  .  .  . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  .  .  . .  . 189
1.2.4.  Conclusion.  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . . . .  . . . .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . .  . . . .  .  .  .  .  .189
1.3.  How  different  are  ‘explained’  and ‘unexplained’  symptoms?  .  . . . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . .  .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  . .  .  . .  190
1.4.  Interim  summary  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . .  . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  190
2.  A  new  perspective  .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  .  .  . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . .  . . . . . . .  .  . .  . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  . . . .  .  . .  . . . .  . .  .  . . .  .  190
2.1. Aims  and central  tenets  . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  190
2.2.  Interoception  as  inference  . . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  .  . . . .  . . . .  .  .  . .  .  . .  .  191
2.2.1.  Prediction,  prediction  error  and precision  . . . . . .  .  .  . . . .  .  . .  .  . .  . .  .  .  . . . . . .  . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . 191
2.2.2.  Neurobiological  considerations  . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  . .  . . . . .  .  .  .  . . . . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  . .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . 193
2.2.3. Interoception,  expectations  and the  sense  of self  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  .  . . . .  . .  . . . .  .  .  . .  . . . .  . . . .  . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . .  . .  .  . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  .  . 193
2.3.  Interoceptive  inference  and  symptom  perception  . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . .  .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . . .  .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . .  .  . .  .  . 194
2.4. Factors  inﬂuencing  symptom  perception  . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . .  . . 1952.4.1. Varieties  of afferent  input  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . .
2.4.2.  Varieties  of attention  .  . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . . . . .  .  .  .
2.4.3.  Gender  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . .  . . . . .  . . .  .  .  . .
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: omer.vandenbergh@kuleuven.be (O. Van den Bergh).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.01.015
149-7634/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  .  .  .  . . . .  .  .  . . . . 195
 . .  .  . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . 195
 .  . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . .  . .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . .  .  . .  .  . .  . .  . . . 196
186 O. Van den Bergh et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203
2.4.4.  Threat  and  negative  affect  (NA)  . . . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  .  .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  . .  196
2.5. Summary  .  . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  197
3.  Implications  .  . . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  197
3.1.  Theoretical  implications  .  .  . . .  .  . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . .  .  .  .  . . . . . . .  . 197
3.2.  Clinical  implications  . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  .  . . . .  . .  . . . .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  .  .  . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  . .  .  . . . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . . 198
3.2.1.  Diagnostic  implications  .  .  . . .  .  . .  . .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . .  . . .  . .  .  .  . .  . . . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  . . 198
3.2.2.  Treatment  implications  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . .  . . . . . .  . .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . .  .  . . .  . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  .  .  . . . .  . .  .  .  . 198
3.3.  Translating  the  model  into  testable  hypotheses  . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  .  . .  .  .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . 199
4.  Summary  and  conclusions  . . .  .  . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  .  .  . . .  . .  .  .  . . . .  . .  .  . . . .  .  .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  . .  199
Conﬂict  of interest  .  .  .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . .  . .  . .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . . .  . .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  . . .  . . . . .  . .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  . . . . . .  . .  .  .  . . . .  . .200
Authors  contribution  .  .  . .  . . .  .  .  . . . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . .  .  . .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . .  . .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . . 200
Acknowlegements  . .  .  . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . .  .  . .  . . . . .  . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  .  .  . .  . . .  .  . . . .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . .  . . . . . . . . .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . . . . . . .  . 200
. .  .  . . .
1
t
w
m
w
m
p
t
r
t
e
i
m
d
i
s
t
s
t
t
A
a
t
r
v
n
c
s
s
u
e
b
t
i
“
c
o
t
b
e
e
1
iReferences  . . .  . .  . . .  .  .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  .  . . . . 
. The disease model and medically unexplained symptoms
Standard medical practice is premised on a disease model
hat typically comprises two phases. The diagnostic phase begins
hen symptoms are reported to a physician, who  looks to deter-
ine their cause through history taking, physical examination and,
here appropriate, medical investigations. This information, which
ainly concerns the patient’s body, is mapped onto a set of patho-
hysiological criteria that allow for diagnosis and treatment. In the
herapeutic phase, the aim is to remedy dysfunction and thereby
emove the patient’s symptoms.
This apparently logical process is often successful, but it some-
imes fails dramatically. A particularly compelling (and common)
xample of this is when the patient reports symptoms despite tests
ndicating that their body is healthy, or where “successful” treat-
ent for diagnosed disease fails to resolve symptoms. In such cases,
octors often make renewed attempts to identify disease, reﬂect-
ng one of the fundamental assumptions of this model: that physical
ymptoms have physiological causes, and can therefore be reduced
o them. If the symptoms persist but a disease cause remains elu-
ive, then the patient may  be given a diagnosis that simply describes
heir complaint (e.g., chronic fatigue) or another label that identiﬁes
hem as suffering from “medically unexplained symptoms” (MUS).
lthough the biopsychosocial model has ensured that symptoms
re no longer seen as purely biological phenomena, medical prac-
ice continues to be dominated by the view that “real” symptoms
eﬂect bodily dysfunction, and that those symptoms that cannot be
alidated objectively are “in the mind” or simply made up.
In this paper, we draw on previous approaches to develop a
ovel model of symptom perception that transcends the artiﬁ-
ial distinction between “explained” and “unexplained” physical
ymptoms, whilst explaining the variable relationship between
ymptoms and physiological dysfunction. The central principle
nderpinning this account is that physical symptoms, as felt and
xpressed by patients, are not a direct record of bodily activity,
ut an inference based on implicit predictions about interocep-
ive information, derived from prior knowledge. An important
mplication of this account is that symptoms often result from an
inferential leap”, resulting in an experience that is only loosely
oupled with dysfunctional processes in the peripheral body, and
ccasionally has no relationship at all. We  use this framework
o describe the conditions under which a close correspondence
etween subjective symptoms and objective physiology might be
xpected, and when the two are likely to diverge. We  conclude by
xploring some clinical and empirical implications..1. Extent and varieties of MUS
Physical symptoms that occur in the absence of detectable phys-
ological dysfunction are ubiquitous. In a population-based study .  . .  .  . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . .  . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  .  .  . . . .  . .  .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . . .  .  . . . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  . . . .  . . . 200
in Germany (N = 2552), for example, 81.6% of people reported at
least one medically unexplained symptom causing at least mild
impairment (Hiller et al., 2006). In primary care, up to three quar-
ters of all symptoms reported are thought not to be attributable
to organic disease. About 25% of general practice patients have
clinically relevant MUS  (e.g., Fink et al., 2007; Körber et al., 2011)
and 8–10% of primary care patients have a history of multiple,
distressing MUS  (e.g., Kroenke et al., 1997). Symptom burden in
individuals with MUS  seems to be continuously distributed, rang-
ing from non-consulting people with minimal disability (Watson
and Pennebaker, 1989) to those with numerous, chronic, severely
disabling symptoms (e.g., Jasper et al., 2012).
The economic burden is considerable. In the USA, the annual
medical cost of MUS  was  previously estimated at $256 billion
(Barsky et al., 2005), while in the UK they are said to account
for approximately 10% of the National Health Service Budget
(Bermingham et al., 2010). Up to 42 million work days are lost
to MUS  in the UK each year (Bermingham et al., 2010), with the
associated loss of productivity being estimated at $19,000 (US) per
patient over 10 years ago (Hiller et al., 2003).
The disease model clearly struggles to accommodate MUS. It
is not clear what these conditions should be called (e.g., Creed
et al., 2010) or how they should be classiﬁed (e.g., Kroenke et al.,
2007).Various terms have been used apart from MUS, including
“psychosomatic symptoms”, “functional symptoms”, “subjective
health complaints”, “somatization”, “somatic symptom distress”,
and “bodily distress”. However, there is little agreement on which
is most appropriate (Creed et al., 2010; Kroenke et al., 2007) or on
the level of description and analysis needed (i.e. as symptoms, syn-
drome, disorder, or disease). Within general medicine, particular
clusters of MUS  are often termed functional somatic syndromes, a
category that includes irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue
syndrome, ﬁbromyalgia and numerous other specialty-speciﬁc
conditions (Brown, 2007). In psychiatry, particular constellations
of MUS  are classiﬁed as somatoform disorders in the International
Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 1992), a practice that was
mirrored in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR; APA,
2000) until its most recent revision when the term “somatic symp-
tom disorder” was coined (DSM-5; APA, 2013). For the somatoform
disorders, the emphasis is on symptoms, with diagnoses like soma-
tization disorder (which pertains to individuals with multiple MUS)
implying that sufferers have a general tendency to experience MUS
that encompasses all bodily systems. This is also true of other sys-
tems for classifying patients with multiple MUS  (e.g., Fink and
Schröder, 2010; Kroenke et al., 1997; Rief and Hiller, 1999), devel-
oped in response to concerns about the sensitivity and speciﬁcity
of the ICD-10 and DSM-IV criteria.There has been much debate about the overlap between (and
within) the functional somatic syndromes and somatoform disor-
ders (e.g., Henningsen et al., 2007; Wessely et al., 1999; Wessely
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nd White, 2004; Witthöft et al., 2016), and about the nosological
ategorisation of the functional syndromes and somatoform disor-
ers as either diseases or (mental) disorders (Geniats, 2015; Jana
t al., 2012). In addition, the blurred distinction between MUS  and
on-MUS has contributed to the recent removal of the somato-
orm disorders from DSM 5 (APA, 2013) and their replacement
ith a new Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders category.
he centerpiece of this new category, somatic symptom disorder,
ncorporates all patients with chronic, distressing and/or disabling
omatic symptoms who are also exhibiting positive psychologi-
al features (e.g., symptom preoccupation, excessive health worry,
aladaptive illness behavior), irrespective of whether organic dis-
ase has been found. As such, somatic symptom disorder excludes
ess severe cases of MUS/somatoform disorders compared to DSM-
V (Claassen-van Dessel et al., 2016), whist encompassing patients
ith functional somatic syndromes or documented organic disease
here the associated psychological features are also present.
By emphasizing the positive psychological features in response
o bodily symptoms, somatic symptom disorder resolves some of
he issues regarding the classiﬁcation of physical symptoms but not
thers, leading some to propose a return to qualifying diagnoses by
hether the somatic symptoms in question can be explained by a
iomedical condition (see Rief and Martin, 2014; for a discussion).
his illustrates a tension that is likely to remain until the disease
odel is complemented by a framework that explicitly addresses
ow consciously perceived symptoms (medically unexplained and
therwise) come about, and when and how they relate (or not) to
odily dysfunction.
.2. Somatosensory ampliﬁcation and misattribution
Probably the most inﬂuential account of MUS  has been the
omatosensory ampliﬁcation model (Barsky and Wyshak, 1990).
he ampliﬁcation model assumes that MUS  result from stress-
elated physiological arousal in threat-sensitive persons, whose
llness concerns lead them to misattribute normal sensations to
isease causes (e.g., Barsky and Wyshak, 1990; Kolk et al., 2003).
hysiological arousal also prompts the individual to focus attention
n their body (attentional bias or ‘interoceptive hypervigilance’),
owering the threshold for perceiving somatic sensations while
ig. 1. The modal model of symptom perception. According to this model, somatic sympt
rocessing that determines the degree of cognitive representation of this input and therebehavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203 187
priming disease attributions (Barsky and Wyshak, 1990). Misinter-
preting the sensations as threatening then causes a further increase
in arousal, creating a vicious cycle. The core principles of physiolog-
ical arousal, hypervigilance and misattribution arguably constitute
the modal model of MUS, which is shared by a family of clinical
models explaining MUS, hypochondriasis, hyperventilation syn-
drome and panic disorder. These principles are displayed in Fig. 1.
Variations and elaborations on these themes abound. For exam-
ple, there is some disagreement among the models as to the
necessity of altered physiological arousal: in some models it is
assumed that arousal is elevated compared to the normal state
of the body, while in other models it is assumed that arousal can
be within the normal range but perception is increased because
of hypervigilance to it. Exemplars of this family of models are
described in Table 1.
The assumptions shared by these models are central to
cognitive-behavioral treatments for these complaints, because it is
generally thought that there is good evidence for the modal model.
We will brieﬂy discuss this evidence.
1.2.1. Peripheral arousal and stress-related physiology
The popularity of the ampliﬁcation model relies in part on the
observation that physical symptom reports are commonly comor-
bid with symptoms of anxiety and depression (Wessely et al., 1999;
Kroenke, 2003) and consistently associated (r = 0.40–0.50) with
higher trait negative affectivity (NA; i.e., a pervasive tendency to
experience negative affect; Watson and Pennebaker, 1989) and ele-
vated stress levels (Tak and Rosmalen, 2010). Increased symptom
reports in primary care have often been interpreted as resulting
from elevated autonomic arousal (Kolk et al., 2003; Kirmayer et al.,
2004). It is noteworthy, however, that the most extensive labora-
tory and ambulatory studies have not found signiﬁcant differences
between MUS  reporters and healthy controls across a range of
peripheral physiological stress or arousal indicators (e.g., heart rate,
cardiac autonomic activity, respiration, salivary cortisol; Houtveen
et al., 2010; Houtveen and van Doornen, 2007).In functional somatic syndromes, where the clinical picture
is generally more severe, there is ongoing debate about the
importance of physiological abnormalities, with a wide range of
possible causes for symptoms being cited, including stress- and
om perception starts with peripheral somatic afferent input, followed by cognitive
by the strength of conscious symptom perception.
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Table 1
Family of models explaining symptom perception, MUS  and clinical manifestations by relying on peripheral somatic input interacting with attentional and attributional mechanisms.
Authors Scope of the model Peripheral somatic input Attention Attribution and interpretation
Pennebaker (1982);
Watson and
Pennebaker (1989)
Aims to explain the variability in
somatic symptoms in disease states as
well as the occurrence of MUS.
Peripheral input is necessary; may result from
illness processes, from (stress-related) arousal
or be part of normal bodily sensations.
Balance between externally and
internally directed attention, but also
beliefs and personality (e.g. negative
affect) may determine the likelihood
of perceiving bodily sensations,
including normal bodily sensations.
Beliefs, attributions and interpretations further
determine how the sensations will be experienced.
Ciofﬁ (1991) Aims to explain the variability in
somatic interpretations in relation to
symptoms and illnesses.
Peripheral input is necessary; may result from
illness processes, from (stress-related) arousal
or be part of normal bodily sensations.
Attention has a focus and direction,
but also a content: it can be directed
to particular prior hypotheses and
attributions promoting the use of a
speciﬁc label for the sensation
The  use of a label elicits other meanings and belief
structures contributing to causal inferences and
anticipated consequences, affecting illness behavior
Leventhal and
Leventhal (1993)
Aims to explain the variability in
somatic interpretations in relation to
symptoms and illnesses.
Peripheral input is necessary; may result from
physiological diseases processes, from
(stress-related) arousal and emotional
distress, or be part of normal bodily
sensations.
Lay  beliefs and illness representations
direct attention to physical symptoms,
increasing the chances of them being
perceived
Lay beliefs and illness representations also shape the
attribution and interpretation of the sensations.
Barsky and Wyshak
(1990)
Aims to explain somatoform disorders
and medically unexplained symptoms
Peripheral input is necessary; may result from
illness processes, from (stress-related) arousal
or be part of normal bodily sensations.
Heightened attentional focus on
bodily sensations intensiﬁes the
experience and leads to the perception
of relatively weak sensations that
normally remain outside of awareness
(ampliﬁcation)
The sensations are interpreted as threatening and
noxious, increasing distress, inducing heightened
attention and creating a vicious circle.
Kirmayer and Taillefer
(1997)
Aims to explain somatoform disorders
and medically unexplained symptoms
Peripheral input is necessary; may result from
illness processes and from (stress-related)
arousal.
Attentional processes increase
chances for these sensations to be
perceived.
Attribution of sensations to illness, illness-related
worries and concerns inﬂuence distress, illness
behavior and help-seeking, which interact with social
and cultural factors. The latter further inﬂuence
coping with the symptoms.
Kolk et al. (2003) Aims to explain the variability in
somatic symptoms in disease states as
well as the occurrence of MUS.
Peripheral input is necessary; may result from
illness processes, from (stress-related) arousal
or be part of normal bodily sensations.
External context, selective attention
and negative affectivity may inﬂuence
hightened attention and detection
Meanings and attributions guided by illness beliefs
and schemata determine the interpretation of the
sensations as speciﬁc symptoms
Brown (2004) Aims to explain MUS and somatoform
disorders
Peripheral input is not necessary, chronically
activated symptom schemata in an
unconscious primary attentional system (PAS)
may under some circumstances exceed the
awareness threshold and lead to conscious
symptom experiences
In  a secondary, more conscious
attentional system, concerns may
induce elevated vigilance for somatic
sensations contributing to chronically
active symptom schemata
Cognitive elaborations guided by illness beliefs and
schemata may further determine the interpretation of
the symptoms and affect illness behavior
Rief and Barsky (2005) Aims to explain somatoform disorders
and medically unexplained symptoms
Several physiological processes are thought to
contribute to physical sensations, but they
may be of low intensity
A failing attentional ﬁlter system, to
which multiple psychological and
biological factors contribute, can cause
subthreshold physical sensations to be
felt
Cognitive, behavioral and emotional processes
become involved in a vicious circle with biological
mechanisms
Deary et al. (2007) Aims to explain MUS in general with a
speciﬁc focus also on CFS and IBS
Genetic vulnerability, personality-related
distress, early adverse experiences, life events
and HPA-related mechanisms are considered
underlying sources of somatic sensations
Attentional biases, possibly resulting
from “cognitive sensitization”,
increase the probability of
subthreshold sensations being
perceived.
Illness attributions raise the threat value of the
sensations, feeding back to attentional processes,
causing behavioral avoidance and leading to
escalating circles, often further reinforced by
insufﬁcient guidance and reassurance by health care
workers
Henningsen et al.
(2007)
Aims to explain a large variety of
functional somatic disorders (CFS, FM,
IBS, IEI, nonspeciﬁc chest pain, and
several others)
Experience of bodily stress, resulting from
speciﬁable biological (disease), psychological,
interpersonal and/or social factors, is at the
core
Attentional mechanisms are not
speciﬁed, but apparently implied in a
process of interpretation of stress
symptoms as symptoms of a disease
Attribution and interpretation of bodily stress
symptoms as disease may cause anxiety and
depression, adding more bodily stress, stimulating
interpretation as severe disease, and increasing
emotional distress and loss of functioning
Witthöft and Hiller
(2010)
Aims to explain MUS in general and
the core of somatoform disorders and
functional somatic disorders (CFS, FM,
IBS, IEI). Focuses also on similarities
and differences with hypochondriasis
Physiological processes, as related to
alterations in HPA-activity and sustained
physiological arousal may underlie somatic
sensations, but also media reports,
conditioning experiences and chronically
activated memory schemata may contribute
to MUS in the absence of distinct physiological
input
Attentional processes, expectancies
and chronically activated somatic
memories increase the probability of
somatic sensations entering
awareness
Catastrophic interpretations and misattributions,
importantly driven by neuroticism, amplify somatic
sensations, which in turn inspire avoidance behaviors
and illness interpretations. Inadequate response of
health care workers may further fuel the impact of
attentional and cognitive processes, including worry,
on symptom perception and interpretations.
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isease-related autonomic, endocrine and immune responses. It is
mportant to note in this context that a simple causal model may
e too simplistic, and that a distinction should be made between
redisposing, precipitating and perpetuating factors. A speciﬁc
hysiological dysfunction eliciting symptoms in an initial stage (e.g.
nﬂammation, infection) may  be followed by processes that serve
o maintain symptoms, such as stress-related physiology related to,
or example, ongoing concerns. In the latter case, however, reliable
ssociations should still be found between symptoms and physio-
ogical parameters if symptoms reﬂect physiological dysfunction.
Meta-analytic and systematic review studies typically reveal a
ixed picture. If relationships with physiological abnormalities are
ound at all, the associations are inconsistent, generally small, and
he direction of causality between functional somatic syndromes
nd the dysfunction remains unclear, mostly leading to the con-
lusion that there is little convincing evidence for the causal role
f a particular physiological dysfunction. This picture applies to
utonomic function as indicated by heart rate variability: a meta-
nalysis by Tak et al. (2009) found no signiﬁcant difference between
atients with functional somatic disorders and healthy controls
fter controlling for publication bias. Another review found no
ifferences between patients with functional somatic syndromes
nd healthy controls in half of the studies, and some evidence
f reduced cardiac vagal activity in another half, depending also
n the type of functional syndrome (Tak and Rosmalen, 2010). A
ystematic review of Van Cauwenbergh et al. (2014) suggested a
educed cardiac response to a head-up tilt test in chronic fatigue
atients in 7 of 8 studies. Taking the cortisol response to indicate
ypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis functioning, Tak et al.
2011) only found evidence for lower cortisol levels in chronic
atigue patients and in females with ﬁbromyalgia, but not in irri-
able bowel syndrome. A review by Powell et al. (2013) could not
stablish hypocortisolism in chronic fatigue patients, but found evi-
ence for an attenuation of the diurnal variability of the cortisol
esponse. A similar picture arises from review studies on the role
f inﬂammatory, infectious, or autoimmune dysfunction in func-
ional somatic syndromes: few differences are found, and if so, they
ostly pertain to different parameters (see Borchers and Gershwin,
015; Üc¸ eyler et al., 2011; Blundell et al., 2015; Ishihara et al.,
013; Schwille-Kiuntke et al., 2015). Importantly, whenever a dys-
unction is observed, few studies test whether the abnormalities
ctually cause or mediate the symptoms in question.
.2.2. Interoceptive hypervigilance, thresholds and awareness
Some versions of the ampliﬁcation model give relatively more
eight to hypervigilance and lowered perceptual thresholds for
ormal physiological arousal. Self-report studies indeed show that
ndividuals with MUS  report a tendency to scan the body for signs of
llness (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2005; Rief et al., 1998). However, objec-
ive measures of attention to health-related stimuli have yielded
ess consistent ﬁndings. For symbolic material (e.g., illness words),
ome studies have found increased interference on the emotional
troop task in patients with MUS  (e.g., Afzal et al., 2006; Lim and
im, 2005; Witthöft et al., 2006). These effects may  be attributable
o increased avoidance of health-threat rather than engagement
ith it (De Ruiter and Brosschot, 1994), however, or stimulus neg-
tivity more generally (Posserud et al., 2009). Studies using the
ot-probe and exogenous cueing paradigms have not found evi-
ence of attentional bias in MUS  patients (Chapman and Martin,
011; Hou et al., 2008; Martin and Alexeeva, 2010; Martin and
hapman, 2010; van der Veek et al., 2014; Witthöft et al., 2006).
Studies comparing ﬁbromyalgia patients and healthy controls
ound no difference in their ability to detect innocuous tactile stim-
li (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014; Van Damme  et al., 2014), and/or
bserved that only NA predicted daily symptom reports (Mussgay
t al., 1999; Schaefer et al., 2012). Other studies investigating atten-behavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203 189
tional processing of bodily sensations themselves provide some
evidence for a relationship between attention to the body and
symptom reporting, although also implicate avoidance of bodily
sensations (Brown et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2010). Interestingly,
Katzer et al. (2012) found that lower tactile perceptual thresholds
were associated with fewer symptoms in patients with somato-
form disorders on the Somatic Signal Detection Task (SSDT). Other
studies found that both somatoform disorders (Katzer et al., 2012)
and symptom reporting more generally (Brown et al., 2010, 2012;
Katzer et al., 2011) were associated with a tendency to report
sensory experiences on the SSDT regardless of whether stimuli
were actually presented (i.e. ‘false alarms’), seemingly contradict-
ing the prediction of improved accuracy. Similarly, Van den Bergh
and colleagues found signiﬁcantly lower correspondence between
induced respiratory changes and self-reported breathlessness in a
CO2 inhalation paradigm for non-clinical MUS  reporters (Bogaerts
et al., 2008) and MUS  patients (Bogaerts et al., 2010b).
In sum, individuals with MUS  consistently report a tendency to
scan their bodies for signs of illness, but studies measuring actual
attentional deployment towards body- or illness-related stimuli
fail to provide convincing evidence for an attentional bias towards
these stimuli. Although the available evidence remains too limited
for a ﬁrm conclusion, most evidence points to a lower correspon-
dence between physiological changes and symptom reports in
these individuals.
1.2.3. Misattribution and interpretation bias
The modal model assumes that patients with MUS  and related
conditions show: (i) a tendency to (mis)interpret benign bodily sen-
sations in a negative manner, that is, as overly intense, noxious, and
potentially life-threatening (Nakao and Barsky, 2007); and (ii) a
tendency to attribute somatic sensations to somatic disease, rather
than psychological or neutral/external causes (“somatic attribution
bias”). Evidence in line with the (mis)interpretation assumption
has been documented for most MUS-related conditions, such as
chronic pain, somatoform disorders, fatigue, health anxiety and
hypochondriasis (Goedendorp et al., 2013; Marcus et al., 2007;
Rief et al., 1998; Rief and Broadbent 2007; Rief and Martin, 2014).
These beliefs correlate with various ratings indicating the aver-
sive quality of induced or existent bodily sensations, such as (pain)
threshold and unpleasantness. Such beliefs are also reﬂected in
behavioral evidence of a correlation between MUS, health anxi-
ety, hypochondriasis and the automatic negative evaluation of both
illness-related pictures (Jasper and Witthöft, 2013), illness words
(Schreiber et al., 2014), and aversive tactile stimuli (Witthöft et al.,
2012), although this effect was not found in patients with non-
cardiac chest pain (Schroeder et al., 2014). It is not clear whether
such ﬁndings point to a cause or consequence of MUS. One recent
longitudinal population-based study found that catastrophic mis-
interpretations of bodily sensations at baseline were a signiﬁcant
predictor of hypochondriacal concerns and fear of bodily sensations
18 months later, but not of physical symptom reports as assessed
by a symptom checklist (Woud et al., 2016). Apparently, in this
study catastrophic misinterpretations contributed to later cogni-
tive and emotional responses to MUS, but not to the occurrence
of MUS  themselves. Obviously, replications are needed to conﬁrm
this conclusion.
Studies focusing on the attribution style of patients with MUS
suggested a dominance of somatic symptom attributions (e.g., Craig
et al., 1993; Robbins and Kirmayer, 1991), but recent evidence indi-
cates that they are more complex than this (Hiller et al., 2010)
and that somatic attributions do not predict the course of MUS
(Douzenis and Seretis, 2013), implying that they are unlikely to play
a causal role in the development and maintenance of symptoms.
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.2.4. Conclusion
Although the ampliﬁcation model is intuitively appealing and
emains clinically popular, the available evidence does not provide
onvincing support for the notion that MUS  result from dysreg-
lated peripheral (stress) physiology, hypervigilance for bodily
ensations, heightened interoceptive accuracy, or misinterpre-
ations of bodily sensations. The notable lack of evidence that
eripheral physiological abnormalities play a speciﬁc and causal
ole in functional somatic syndromes has contributed to growing
nterest among researchers in the concept of central sensitization
s a potential common ground for functional somatic syndromes
see further; Kim and Chang, 2012; Nijs et al., 2012; Bourke et al.,
015). More generally, theorizing seems to have evolved towards
dentifying MUS  as perceptual (or interoceptive) conditions (e.g.,
rown, 2004; Edwards et al., 2012).
.3. How different are ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ symptoms?
If standard medical practice regards MUS  and functional somatic
yndromes as unusual phenomena that should be exported to
he psychological/psychiatric domain, it is generally assumed that
he disease model fares better as an account of the symptoms
hen dysfunction is actually present. Indeed, the correspondence
etween symptoms and objective physiological parameters is gen-
rally high for acute and localized dysfunction or pain (Price et al.,
001). This correspondence is both moderate and highly vari-
ble in many multi-symptomatic and chronic diseases, however.
or example, there is a poor correspondence between somatic
ymptoms and objective disease severity in about 50% of asthma
atients depending on the measure (Janssens et al., 2009). In
hronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), large scale stud-
es on several thousands of patients showed large between-person
ariability in the relationship between objective airﬂow limitation
FEV1) and self-reported breathlessness, with a modest correlation
verall (r = 0.36, Agusti et al., 2010; r = 0.28, Müllerová et al., 2014).
Within cardiology, the observed correlation between self-
eported symptoms and objective parameters of heart disease
24-h ambulatory monitoring, trans-telephonic ECGs, data from
mplanted pacemakers or deﬁbrillators) ranges from near zero
Barsky, 2001) to 0.17 (Sears et al., 2005). Similarly, the likelihood of
eported arrhythmia symptoms coinciding with an actual arrhyth-
ia  ranges from 17% to 61.1%. Reports of atrial ﬁbrillation have
een found in the absence of tachyarrhythmias in 25% to 45% of
ases (Atarashi et al., 2008; Strickberger et al., 2005). Furthermore,
egardless of their effect on objective physiological functioning,
rait negative affect, negative emotions, and/or depression have
ften been found to predict symptom reports better than objec-
ive measures of cardiac or respiratory disease (e.g., Janssens et al.,
009; Sears et al., 2005; Van Oudenhove et al., 2008). Data have
lso shown that a transient increase in stress levels can alter the
erception of symptoms in patients with gastro-esophageal reﬂux
isease, resulting in increased symptom reports (Fass et al., 2008;
right et al., 2005).
Subjective symptom reports correlating poorly with physiolog-
cal changes have also been found in diabetes, for which accurate
etection of health status is of crucial importance. Frankum and
gden (2005), for example, found that 43.3% of patients underes-
imated their blood glucose and 17.3% overestimated it. Similarly,
yan et al. (2002) found that estimation of blood glucose was only
8% accurate for hypoglycemia and 38% for euglycemia in a sam-
le of adolescents and young adults. Although there have been
tudies showing greater correlations (0.70) between estimated and
ctual blood glucose (Schandry et al., 1996), symptom perception
n this context is generally considered inaccurate. Evidence also
hows that physicians’ assessment of symptoms is more highly cor-behavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203
related with objective organic parameters (0.52–0.92) than those
of patients (0.34–0.70; Turner et al., 2010).
In sum, research with medical populations suggests that corre-
lations between symptom reports and objective disease indicators
vary substantially, are often low to moderate, and that emotional
factors play a particularly signiﬁcant role in symptom reporting. In
other words, a large proportion of the symptoms presented in the
context of a well-deﬁned disease could technically be considered
“MUS”. This is mostly overlooked, however, as few studies actually
measure the within-person correspondence between physiological
dysfunction and symptom reports.
1.4. Interim summary
The divide of western medical systems into either ‘physical’ or
‘mental’ health disciplines is arguably responsible for most contro-
versies regarding MUS, with physical and mental health specialists
favoring distinct terms, diagnostic criteria and illness narratives for
an overlapping set of complaints. Numerous commentators have
criticized the oversimplifying mind-body dualism that is inher-
ent to this approach (Rief and Martin, 2014). In addition, a brief
excursion into “medically explained diseases” casts doubt on the
logic of a clear differentiation between symptoms that do and
do not have a physiological explanation. Evidently, there is some
continuity in the mechanisms underlying all symptom reporting,
whether an ‘organic’ condition is present or not. Since the seminal
monograph of Pennebaker on the psychology of physical symptoms
(Pennebaker, 1982), and extensive elaborations in later models
(see Ciofﬁ, 1991; Leventhal and Leventhal, 1993; Leventhal et al.,
1998), the role of psychological factors in symptom reporting and
health care use has been clearly documented. These models typi-
cally describe how factors such as beliefs, attributions, emotional
states and attention modulate the relationship between physio-
logical dysfunction and symptom reports, but rarely question the
basic assumption of the disease model. Moreover, they provide lit-
tle insight into how consciously perceived symptoms come about,
and when or how they relate (or not) to bodily dysfunction. There is
a clear need for a symptom perception model that complements the
disease model by explaining both “explained” and “unexplained”
symptoms, without having to rely on the concept of peripheral
physiological change in all cases. We attempt to provide such a
framework below.
2. A new perspective
2.1. Aims and central tenets
In this section we  describe a comprehensive model of symp-
tom perception that integrates research and theory on MUS  and
functional disorders with that on symptom and body perception
more generally. Our goal is to describe the mechanisms underly-
ing the conscious experience of somatic symptoms, and thereby
the conditions that govern how and when those symptoms corre-
spond with physiological dysfunction. We argue that MUS  reﬂect a
perceptual system that is continually generating, testing and reﬁn-
ing hypotheses about the causes of sensory inputs, and which is
vulnerable to mistaken inferences and false percepts under certain
conditions. We  suggest that MUS  can be regarded as somatovis-
ceral illusions, comparable to visual illusions in casting light on
fundamental aspects of perception (also Norman et al., 2014). We
claim that this process of automatic and unconscious hypothesis
testing applies as much to “veridical” symptom perception (where
symptoms correspond closely with physiological dysfunction), as
to biased symptom perception (where symptom reports seem only
partly consistent with physiological data), and MUS  (where no rela-
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ionship with physiological data is found at all). The central tenets
f our account can be summarised as follows:
. Somatic symptoms are conscious percepts that result from a con-
structive process, in which the brain interprets information from
the body in the light of predictions (broadly speaking, expecta-
tions) given past experience; this process is moderated by the
relative precision afforded to the predictions and the prediction
errors;
. The relationship between parameters of bodily dysfunction and
self-reported symptoms is highly variable both between and
within individuals over time, depending on interactions between
characteristics of the physiological input, the (historical) person
and the context; key factors in this respect are those governing
the individual’s interoceptive sensitivity/acuity and the implicit
categorization criteria used to decide whether a sensation is a
symptom;
. The relationship between parameters of bodily dysfunction and
self-reported symptoms varies dimensionally. Although MUS  are
at one end of this continuum, they are functionally compara-
ble both to biased symptom reports of identiﬁable physiological
dysfunction and symptoms experienced in the context of well-
described diseases;
. The very process of enquiring about the presence of somatic per-
cepts inﬂuences how we experience our body and thereby the
symptoms we report.
Our approach is fundamentally different from traditional symp-
om perception accounts, which assume that “. . .the perception of
hysical symptoms is generally preceded by peripheral, physiological
hanges” (Kolk et al., 2003, p. 2344) ; see Table 1). It builds on previ-
us accounts of MUS  (the Integrative Cognitive Model, ICM; Brown,
004, 2006, 2013; Brown and Reuber, 2016) and functional neu-
ological and motor symptoms (“conversion symptoms”; Edwards
t al., 2012), which assume that peripheral physiological input is
either necessary nor sufﬁcient for symptoms to be experienced.
y this view, top-down processes not only inﬂuence how, but also
hether we experience symptoms. As in the ICM, we regard MUS
s distortions in awareness brought about by the over-activation
f symptom representations in memory, with various top-down
actors serving to maintain this; we move beyond the ICM by inte-
rating our approach more explicitly with existing work on body
erception and interoception, and with accounts of the neurobio-
ogical substrates of these processes. We  also place more emphasis
n affective processing, and address certain limitations of the ICM in
elation to the role of attention in symptom development and main-
enance. Our account follows Edwards et al. (2012) in adopting a
redictive coding perspective to help elucidate the mechanisms of
US. However, Edwards et al. (2012) focuses speciﬁcally on func-
ional motor and sensory symptoms (e.g., anaesthesia, movement
isorders, sensory loss), and excludes functional symptoms involv-
ng autonomic dysfunction and/or arousal, functional syndromes
nd other somatization problems (Edwards et al., 2012 p. 3496).
he latter are the main focus of our paper, in the context of symp-
om perception more generally. We  limit ourselves to processes
hat help explain how the conscious experience of bodily symptoms
omes about, although we acknowledge that symptom perception
ccurs in an interpersonal and social context that evidently shapes
ow symptoms are labelled and reported. For the sake of brevity,
hese social processes are only indirectly taken into account in our
odel.
We start by describing the basic processes underlying percep-
ion of the internal state of the body.behavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203 191
2.2. Interoception as inference
Although a continuous, ﬂuctuating array of stimuli impinges on
receptors inside our body, most interoceptive information is used
by local and subcortical regulation systems and is not amenable to
conscious perception. From the limited amount of sensory informa-
tion that afferent systems can process, the brain could theoretically
create an inﬁnite number of patterns of experiences. The task of
the brain is to group input into those patterns that are most useful,
reducing computational load by ignoring inputs that are unlikely
to have adaptive value. Since Helmholtz (1860), numerous theo-
rists (e.g., Gregory, 1980; Friston, 2005; Kveraga et al., 2007; Clark,
2013) have argued that the brain achieves this through an inferen-
tial process, involving the creation of probabilistic models about the
causes of current inputs to the system, based on prior knowledge.
These assumptions have recently been elaborated for interocep-
tive and affective information processing and their interaction with
external perception (Barrett and Bar, 2009; Edwards et al., 2012;
Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015). Chronic pain has recently
been conceptualized using a predictive coding perspective, as has
the modulation of pain perception by placebo and nocebo expec-
tations (see Büchel et al., 2014; Hechler et al., 2016; Wiech, 2016).
Our account builds on these approaches.
2.2.1. Prediction, prediction error and precision
In predictive coding models, learned knowledge about the world
is conceptualized as a set of neural representations or ‘priors’, which
capture the statistical regularities of brain activity. These are repre-
sented as probability distributions that describe an expected range
of values for a given input and their associated likelihood (Fig. 2).
Different prior distributions match sensory inputs (“observation”
in Fig. 2) to varying degrees, resulting in prediction errors (i.e., the
portion of input not predicted by the prior, or the difference in mean
between prior and “observed” distributions).
Every combination of prior and observed distributions consti-
tutes a model of the causes of the actual stimulation, each with a
different range of probabilities (posterior distribution).
These generative models initially capture the gist of the stim-
ulus array (Kveraga et al., 2007), and prediction errors are then
used to further reﬁne them. A fundamental “motivation” of the
system is to minimize prediction error (Friston, 2005). This pro-
cess can be accomplished by updating the prior to account for
unpredicted stimulation (perceptual inference; broadly speaking:
changing “expectations”), by generating information that ﬁts the
prior through action (active inference), or by changing how input
is sampled by the brain (Barrett and Simmons, 2015). The system
that accomplishes this is hierarchically organized, such that lower
levels of the hierarchy represent the basic properties of the sen-
sory input, with complexity, abstraction and spatio-temporal scale
increasing as one proceeds through the hierarchy. There is a con-
tinuous, bi-directional ﬂow of information through this hierarchy,
such that each level receives predictions from, and feeds back pre-
diction errors to, the levels above. In a continuous interplay of these
processes, bottom-up information (prediction errors) is dependent
on top-down inﬂuences (predictions), which themselves are inﬂu-
enced by previous prediction errors depending on their precision. It
also means that dysfunctional predictions will have consequences
for predictions errors, and vice versa (see below).
Across a number of experiences, predictions and prediction
errors may  acquire associated “conﬁdence”, represented by the
variance around the mean of the distribution (i.e., they have differ-
ent precisions).  A precise prior corresponds to a strong prediction,
allowing for perceptual decisions with a high level of conﬁdence.
We use the term conﬁdence in a statistical sense only, since these
perceptual decisions rarely reach the level of awareness for them
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Fig. 2. a-c: The relationship between prior and posterior distributions in the light of new observations. The upper panel represents the impact of a low precision prior (blue)
on  the posterior distribution (red) in the light of new evidence (green). In this case of a weak prior, new information has substantial impact on the formation of a posterior
interpretation. The middle panel represents the impact of a high precision prior distribution on the posterior distribution, given evidence that disconﬁrms the prior to some
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his  ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
o manifest as meta-cognitive certainty; instead, the subject simply
erceives what the system has concluded is (or is not) there.
Consider the case of a newly developed condition such as
sthma, when a patient starts to encounter interoceptive sensa-
ions that may  or may  not represent an asthma symptom. In Fig. 2a,
elatively few prior observations are available, meaning that the
erceptual system is less certain whether a sensation (e.g., feeling of
ightness in the chest) is a relevant indicator of the person’s health
tatus. This is represented in Fig. 2a as a relatively broad, ﬂat prior
istribution, that is, one with relatively low precision with a cen-
ral tendency that is located at a low probability (central tendency
n the left hand side of the x axis), indicating that the diagnostic
alue of this sensation for asthma is low. Comparatively precise
ew observations (grey line) have a considerable impact on such aat are inconsistent with the prediction but are impreciseand therefore have little
 reference to symptom perception. (For interpretation of the references to color in
vague prior and shift the initial hypothesis to be closer to the new
evidence (the posterior; black line). As more observations are made
(e.g., over the course of a year), the system learns that the sensation
is indeed a valid indicator of asthma, resulting in a narrower, denser
(i.e., more precise) prior distribution that shifted to the right as
the estimated probability of the sensation being an asthma symp-
tom increased (dashed line in Fig. 2b). The larger amount of past
evidence by this point means that the same amount of new infor-
mation (i.e., new encounters with the sensation; grey line in 2b)
has less of an impact on the inference process than before, mean-
ing that the posterior distribution (black line in 2b) remains close
to the prior. Fig. 2c illustrates a case where, in contrast to the ﬁrst
two examples, the probability of a sensation indicating asthma on
the basis of prior experiences is high, while the somatic sensation
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observation) is less precise. Here there is even less of an impact of
he new observation, resulting in minimal change from the prior
istribution and stronger editing of the incoming information. The
esult is an experience (posterior) that reﬂects the prior rather than
he observation, with pre-existing expectations being maintained.
In precise distributions there is a greater likelihood that the
xpected/actual value falls close to the mean, resulting in a larger
nﬂuence on the generative model. Typically, the model with
he lowest overall prediction error is that with the optimal bal-
nce between precision and accuracy (i.e., the smallest difference
etween the means of the predicted and prediction error distribu-
ions). An important aspect of the perceptual process is how the
ystem determines whether the prediction is an adequate account
f the input. In order to do this, it must be able to estimate the
ikelihood of any residual prediction error being random noise, or
hether it could be reduced further by updating the prediction.
he system does so by developing context-dependent expectations
bout the likely precision of its inputs, and it compensates for these
y adjusting the weight placed on them in the perceptual process
Hohwy, 2012). Visual prediction errors are higher in the dark, for
xample, and relatively more likely to be a product of noise than
ignal than when it is light. In contrast, the system learns that errors
rising in the light are likely to be meaningful (i.e., an unexpected
timulus), and should have more of an inﬂuence on perception.
The process of attributing weights to the prediction errors to
ptimize perception (precision optimization) is thought to be an
mportant factor determining the dominant generative model and
herefore conscious percepts (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Hohwy,
012). Typically, priors have less inﬂuence and are more subject
o revision when processing involves units expecting precise infor-
ation from the sensorium (e.g., in the light). Conversely, priors
ave more of an inﬂuence on perception, and are more resistant to
pdating, when noisy, imprecise sensory input is expected (e.g., in
he dark). One consequence of this is that mistakes can be made
hen unexpected-but-meaningful signals arise when inputs are
redicted to be imprecise, biasing perception towards a precise but
naccurate prior. Thus, we may  mistake Joe for Fred in the dark if
here is a strong expectation that Fred will arrive ﬁrst. In the account
elow we develop the idea that MUS  involve a similar perceptual
rror.
.2.2. Neurobiological considerations
Vagus nerve afferents are a major source of interoceptive infor-
ation, relaying sensory information from nearly every visceral
nd somatic system to the brain through the nucleus tractus soli-
arius (NTS) and ascending projections to brainstem, limbic and
ortical structures (Berthoud and Neuhuber, 2000). Several brain
tructures and circuits are critical in constructing and representing
 conscious state of the body (e.g., Craig, 2002, 2009) forming an
nteroceptive nervous system (Harshaw, 2015). For example, the
nterior insular cortex is generally considered to play a central
ole in constructing a multimodal representation of the internal
tate of the body, integrating hormonal, immunological, metabolic,
hermal, autonomic, visceromotor, proprioceptive, exteroceptive,
otivational and cognitive sources of information (Craig, 2009;
ritchley and Harrison, 2013). The anterior insular cortex is also
onsidered to play a critical role as a source of visceromotor
redictions and in matching prediction errors with predictions
Seth, 2013; Seth et al., 2011). Through close connections with
he anterior cingulate cortex, these multi-modal representations
lso involve affective-motivational components and associated
pproach-avoidance tendencies, consistent with the close con-
ection between interoceptive inference about bodily states and
eelings and emotions (Seth, 2013; Zaki et al., 2012). Other struc-
ures involved in processing the affective value of interoceptive
timuli are the orbitofrontal (Barrett and Bar, 2009) and ventrome-behavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203 193
dial prefrontal cortex, which, together with parts of the cingulate
cortex, are thought to constitute a stimulus valuation network
(Harshaw, 2015) that engages behavioral control systems when
local physiological regulation fails (e.g., gasping for air and opening
the window when breathless).
A predictive coding perspective assumes that precision is repre-
sented by the action of speciﬁc cells that tune the synaptic gain (i.e.,
post-synaptic responsiveness) of cells encoding predictions and
prediction errors (Friston, 2008; Barrett and Simmons, 2015). As
there is a constant interplay between priors and prediction errors
at multiple hierarchical levels, a predictive coding model surpasses
simple and unidirectional conceptions of “top-down” and “bottom-
up” processes, as well as the notion that speciﬁc functions are
localized to particular brain regions. Consistent with this, recent
neurobiological models have emphasized continuous interactions
between counter-ﬂowing streams of information at multiple hier-
archical levels. Barrett and Simmons’ (2015) Embodied Predictive
Interoceptive Coding model describes an integrated neural network
that serves both homeostatic and allostatic control functions as
well as interoception. It emphasizes more widespread corticocor-
tical connectivity across hierarchically organized lamina (cortical
columns) forming granular, agranular and (intermediate) dys-
granular cortices. These cortices consist of anatomically different
cells acting as prediction, prediction error and precision neurons.
Agranular visceromotor cortices comprising mid-cingulate, ante-
rior cingulate cortex, posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
parts of the anterior insula generate autonomic, hormonal and
immunological predictions to adjust the body to anticipated needs.
This information is also sent to granular cortices comprising the
mid-to-posterior insula, where prediction errors are calculated and
sent back to agranular visceromotor regions; here, outputs to the
body are modulated and new interoceptive predictions arise. Vis-
ceromotor cortices can also modulate the gain of corticothamalic
and thalamocortical connections (i.e., attention to interoceptive
sensations).
Importantly, agranular visceromotor regions are considered to
be relatively insensitive to prediction error signals due to precision-
weighting factors and aspects of the cytoarchitecture. For this
reason, interoceptive prediction errors are typically small, mean-
ing that interoceptive perception (the posterior model) is largely
dominated by prior expectations. As Barrett and Simmons (2015,
p. 424) put it: “interoceptive perception is largely a construction
of beliefs that are kept in check by the actual state of the body
(rather than vice versa)”. Another important feature is that agranu-
lar visceromotor cortices are a central hub sending efferent copies
of predictions to multiple sensory systems across the brain, and
thus subserve “a multisensory representation of the world from
the perspective of someone with a body” (Barrett and Simmons
(2015, p. 424)). This architecture contributes to embodiment of
perception, cognition and emotion, and to bi-directional pene-
trance (i.e., cross-fertilisation) of interoceptive and exteroceptive
information (Harshaw, 2015; for examples). These neurobiological
ﬁndings place important constraints on theories of symptom per-
ception, which is evidently highly sensitive to prior expectations
and contextual cues.
2.2.3. Interoception, expectations and the sense of self
Conceptualising interoception as inference blurs the distinc-
tion between perceptions and beliefs or expectations. Consistent
with this, neurobiological ﬁndings show that largely the same
brain areas are activated regardless of whether symptoms are
produced using expectancy manipulations or elicited by periph-
eral stimulation. For example, an fMRI study of patients with
disabling self-reported electrosensitivity exposed to sham mobile
phone radiation found activation in the same brain regions (ante-
rior cingulate cortex; left and right anterior insular cortex) as that
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roduced by actual nociceptive stimulation (heat pain; Landgrebe
t al., 2008). Similarly, Derbyshire et al. (2004) found that hypnotic
uggestions for pain activated the same brain areas as a thermal
ain stimulus, including anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insu-
ar cortex and somatosensory cortex (S2). In placebo analgesia to
xperimental pain, activations also emerge in similar brain areas to
hose involved in processing the sensory and emotional/affective
omponents of pain (Enck et al., 2008).
Interoceptive representations are thought to be central to the
ense of self, the experience of body ownership and the feeling of
eing “present” in the world (Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013). When
onﬂict is created between interoceptive and exteroceptive infor-
ation, the process of minimizing prediction error can give rise to
omatosensory disturbances in which the core classes of me/not me
re confused. In the Rubber Hand Illusion, for example, a fake hand
an be experienced as one’s own if it is stroked at the same time
nd rate as the genuine (but concealed) body part (Botvinick and
ohen, 1998). Interestingly, people with poor interoceptive sen-
itivity tend to report a stronger illusion (Tsakiris et al., 2011). A
ore prosaic example is the illusory sense of motion that is often
xperienced when sitting on a stationary train and observing a
eighboring train depart. These and other examples illustrate how
erceptual inference can misrepresent the true causes of events in
he world, giving rise to unusual yet compelling somatosensory
xperiences. We  suggest that similar processes are operating in
US  and other cases of symptom misperception.
.3. Interoceptive inference and symptom perception
Subjective feeling states and embodied selfhood rely on active
nference about a multisensory array of interoceptive and exte-
oceptive signals (Clark, 2013; Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons,
015). Accordingly, the feeling of being healthy may  be considered
n inference of the experiencing self, whereby somatic prediction
rrors (e.g., normal somatic variations) are accounted for by pre-
ictions regarding what constitutes a “normal body condition”.
his applies even in the context of continuous and varying input
rom bodily receptors to the brain, as long as those inputs remain
ithin the predicted range. Subjectively, this is likely to be expe-
ienced as the relative absence of interoceptive sensations and
odily awareness. By this view, interoceptive sensations only arise
n the event of a sufﬁcient increase in prediction error, with the
hreshold for the required increase (i.e., the error “tolerance”) vary-
ng across situations and individuals. A crucial reference point for
hese prediction errors are the innate values for homeostasis (i.e.,
built-in’ priors or predictions about viable physiological function-
ng) that have emerged from biological evolution (Van De Cruys,
014). When there is deviation from these homeostatic reference
alues, the resulting interoceptive error signals will often be mini-
ized by automatic physiological regulation mechanisms. If these
ow-level mechanisms remain unsuccessful, or when prediction
rrors are strong and persistent, the errors may  give rise to inte-
oceptive sensations (i.e., phenomenal percepts pertaining to the
ody, associated with varying degrees of conscious awareness) and
ecruit behavioral control systems to reduce prediction error and
e-establish homeostasis.
Aside from the statistical regularities of the inputs them-
elves and the homeostatic reference values, symptom perception
epends on the priors that have been acquired over the course of
he individual’s learning history concerning the potential causes
f somatosensory inputs. At higher levels of representation, this
ncludes abstract information about both normative (e.g., tempo-
ary dehydration; physical exercise) and non-normative causes
e.g., disease). The latter are broadly equivalent to the symptom
chemata, symptom representations and illness representations
escribed in other models (e.g., Leventhal et al., 1992; Pennebaker,behavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203
1982; Ciofﬁ, 1991; Brown, 2004). Whether the input is experienced
as a symptom or a sensation depends on the nature of the best-
ﬁtting model. We  propose that symptoms are experienced when the
generative model with the lowest overall prediction error represents
an interoceptive event with an abnormal (typically disease) cause. In
other words, symptoms arise when the brain interprets interocep-
tive inputs with reference to predictions about the likely cause of
those inputs and infers that there is something wrong with the body
(in which ‘wrongness’ can vary from rather vague [“not well”] to
quite speciﬁc [“cancer”]).
For each set of inputs there are numerous possible interpreta-
tions or predictions, with the phenomenology of the experience
being jointly determined by the predictions and inputs with the
closest match (see Fig. 2). An important implication of this is that
there are many different ways of experiencing a set of inputs,
which vary according to the parameters of the available predictions.
Where the generative model is characterized by a highly accurate
prediction, the associated experience will correspond closely with
the sensory input (i.e., the correlation between subjective reports
and objective physiology will be maximized). Crucially, however,
highly accurate predictions may  not be part of the optimal model,
depending on the precision weights associated with the predictions
and the prediction errors (see below). An important implication of
this is that distorted (as in symptom under- and over-reporting) or
‘false’ perceptions (as in MUS) can arise if the weight of the predic-
tion makes it part of the optimal model, despite accuracy (i.e., the
match between the prediction and the input) being low.
Building on the work of Edwards et al. (2012), we  assume that
symptom reports that are decoupled from sensory input – and MUS
in the extreme case – arise when, in the presence of predictive cues,
excessive precision is afforded to priors predicting the presence
of symptoms/disease, rendering those priors the optimal model
regardless of whether they are a good match for sensory input. As
a result, the individual’s experience is distorted in the direction of
the priors. How much the experience is related to objective physi-
ology will depend on the extent of the mismatch between the prior
and the sensory input and their relative precision weights. In most
disease states, highly precise error signals emerge from multiple
sources in spatiotemporal proximity (e.g., cough, fatigue, running
nose); these will typically combine with contextual cues (e.g., a
partner having a cold) to promote precise priors that explain away
the prediction errors, leaving the person with a clear illness expe-
rience (“I have a cold”) that closely corresponds with measurable
evidence.
Minor distortions may  occur when there is some correspon-
dence between the prior and the input (i.e., the distance between
the means of their distributions is relatively small) but the precision
of the prior pulls the mean of the posterior distribution towards it;
in this case, the experience will be an exaggeration of the input or
particular aspects of it (e.g., making it more painful than might be
expected given the stimulus). In other cases, the mismatch between
the prior and the input may  be more substantial, generating a sub-
jectively real but objectively illusory experience (e.g., MUS; also
Edwards et al., 2012). Studies demonstrating the acquisition of
symptoms through associative learning (e.g., Van den Bergh et al.,
1995, 1997, 2002) suggest this can occur when frequent pairing of a
cue with a veridical (i.e., objectively triggered) somatic experience
raises the predictive validity of the associated prior, giving it greater
perceptual inﬂuence in subsequent encounters with the cue. If the
precision of the prior becomes sufﬁciently high, the cue may  come
to trigger the experience in the absence of the input. These stud-
ies, which involved pairing a harmless odor with CO2-enriched air
inhalation across repeated breathing trials, found that the condi-
tioning effect was  only observed if the odor was negative and only in
high NA individuals and MUS  patients, suggesting that the effect is
dependent on there being a plausible relationship between the cue
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nd symptom experience, and a tendency to perceive bodily threat.
his is relevant for chronic disease, where different contextual cues
ay  come to promote the underlying generative model as symp-
oms are experienced over time. As a result, symptom reports may
radually become decoupled from physiology and more dependent
n contextual cues (De Peuter et al., 2005; Janssens et al., 2009).
ecent research on pain-related placebo and nocebo effects sug-
ests that these processes can arise in the absence of conscious
erception (Jensen et al., 2015). Verbal expectancy manipulations,
uch as those used during hypnotic suggestion and placebo/nocebo
aradigms, are also effective ways of creating (or removing) symp-
om experiences, inﬂuencing both neurobiological and peripheral
hysiological systems at multiple hierarchical levels ranging from
ortical to spinal (Atlas and Wager, 2014; Büchel et al., 2014; Enck
t al., 2013; Jubb and Bensing, 2013).
In sum, symptom experiences may  correspond to varying
egrees with peripheral somatic input, depending on the inter-
lay between prediction errors, priors and their relative precisions.
arious contextual and individual factors modulate this correspon-
ence, the four main types of which are considered below.
.4. Factors inﬂuencing symptom perception
.4.1. Varieties of afferent input
Interoceptive signals can vary along numerous dimensions, such
s intensity, quality, location, extent and duration (e.g., compare
oothache and fatigue). Although agranular visceromotor regions
re considered relatively insensitive to prediction error signals
Barrett and Simmons, 2015; see above), we assume that more
ntense and localized signals (e.g., a racing heart) will generate
ore precise prediction errors that are likely to modify and update
riors accordingly, resulting in an experienced stimulus. How that
ensation is experienced depends on the priors that predict the
ikely consequences of the input. Thus, a benignly pounding heart
ight be experienced as a neutral sensation in the context of recent
xercise, or as a potential heart attack in the presence of cues sug-
esting a possible disease cause. In both cases, perceptual detection
ay  be good (i.e., associated with accurate heartbeat detection), but
erceptual categorization is inaccurate in the latter.
There is greater scope for highly precise but inaccurate priors to
ominate the generative model for somatic stimuli with less precise
rediction errors, such as those that are weaker, more systemic and
idespread, characterized by poor on/off boundaries and/or when
he boundaries with other sensation categories are blurred. Exam-
les of such symptoms include fatigue, inﬂammation-induced
malaise” and somatic input from stress-related HPA-axis acti-
ation. Imprecise prediction errors may  also result from various
ypes of interoceptive dysfunction that inﬂuence the quality and
esolution of the somatic signals that eventually determine con-
cious symptom perception (Harshaw, 2015; Schulz and Vögele,
015). For example, there is experimental evidence that both
ytokines (Eisenberger et al., 2009; Harrison et al., 2009a,b) and
tress/HPA-axis activation inﬂuence structural and/or functional
haracteristics of interoceptive brain areas (Stein et al., 2007; Liston
t al., 2009; Gianaros et al., 2007). Similarly, evidence suggests
hat early life adversity and chronic stress reduce the density and
unctionality of 2-adrenoceptors in the NTS, which may  further
ompromise sensitive processing of afferent signals from the vis-
era (Schulz and Vögele, 2015). Genetic factors may  also contribute
o low signal-to-noise ratios in interoceptive sensitivity (Holliday
t al., 2010; Gazouli et al., 2016). Such mechanisms may  account
or the link between inﬂammatory and stress-related variables,
unctional somatic syndromes and increased symptom reports.
In conditions characterized by both imprecise priors and predic-
ion errors, contextual and individual difference variables may  have
 particularly signiﬁcant impact on symptom experiences, decou-behavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203 195
pling them from physiology. For example, it is possible to induce
symptoms in nonclinical and clinical MUS  patients simply by pre-
senting them with unpleasant pictures, followed by cues (such as
the questions on a symptom scale) promoting attention to par-
ticular models of their somatic state (Constantinou et al., 2013;
Constantinou et al., 2015).
Decoupled symptoms will reﬂect the beliefs that are repre-
sented by the priors in question, suggesting that differences in
beliefs will largely account for the differences in clinical phe-
nomenology. If a belief reﬂects a particularly precise prior about
the presence of a certain experience, it might manifest as a sin-
gle, debilitating unexplained symptom but low symptom reporting
more generally. Where an individual has broader health concerns
(i.e., low precision priors) but the prediction errors are also impre-
cise, a tendency to experience multiple symptoms may  result, as in
habitual symptom reporting and patients with the historic DSM-
IV diagnosis of somatization disorder. It is likely that with broader
health concerns, individual sensitivities and contextual cues may
give more weight to some priors than others, coloring the presenta-
tion accordingly. For example, critical incidents pertaining to bowel
function may  result in greater precision being afforded to gastroin-
testinal symptoms, whereas prior exposure to viral infection may
result in similar emphasis being placed on exhaustion and pain. This
would explain how the same set of complaints can end up attract-
ing different diagnoses (e.g., irritable bowel syndrome vs. chronic
fatigue syndrome) depending on the medical specialty where they
are encountered (Wessely et al., 1999).
2.4.2. Varieties of attention
Attentional modulation of visceromotor prediction errors,
which inﬂuences the balance of precision weights between priors
and prediction errors, is thought to be implemented by gain mecha-
nisms in the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002) and in corticothalamic connections inﬂuenc-
ing the thalamic reticular nucleus (Zikopoulos and Barbas, 2006;
Barrett and Simmons, 2015). This gain mechanism is attracted to
causal regularity in the world, giving a probabilistic advantage to
generative models that maximize the signal-to-noise ratio (Hohwy,
2012). When a cue promoting attention is valid (i.e., predictive),
it facilitates perception of the corresponding stimuli; when it is
invalid, subsequent stimuli will be at a perceptual disadvantage
(Hohwy, 2012). As precision weights vary according to individual
and contextual factors, these factors will inﬂuence the accuracy of
somatic perception.
If there are no cues directing attention to the body, minor
prediction errors may  go unnoticed. In contrast, if priors (e.g.,
illness-related beliefs or worries) increase the gain on interocep-
tive error units (i.e., tilt the balance between precision weights of
priors and prediction errors towards the latter, thereby increas-
ing ‘body-focus’), relatively weak interoceptive stimulation will
be represented as stronger and more precise, reﬂected in more
intense or salient conscious percepts. This is a type of self-fulﬁlling
prophecy: an expectation for a strong bottom-up signal increas-
ing the strength of that signal. The increased prediction error will
also motivate the system to update its priors in order to account
for it. In this context, a model that attributes the inputs to physical
illness might be the optimal way  of explaining away the interocep-
tive error, particularly in the presence of relevant cues (e.g., those
suggesting a possible health threat). Eventually a self-perpetuating
cycle may  arise, with illness-related worrying raising the precision
of associated priors to the point where a disease model pertains,
whether interoceptive stimuli are present or not. In other words,
a symptom may  begin as the ampliﬁcation of a weak somatic
input but end up as a somatosensory false alarm in which noise
is misrepresented as signal. This account uniﬁes the somatosen-
sory ampliﬁcation and ICM within a common framework, while at
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he same time describing critical mechanisms contributing to the
aintenance and chronicity of symptoms over time.
Where somatic signals are expected to be imprecise (due to
ow intensity/ambiguous inputs, noisy receptor systems etc.) there
ill be relatively greater weighting of prior models concerning the
ody. In the absence of precise error feedback to revise those mod-
ls, they are likely to become increasingly divorced from sensory
nput over time. This ﬁts with the evidence reviewed above linking
US  with poor interoceptive accuracy, which is likely to result in
n expectation of imprecise sensory inputs.
Several contextual and individual factors may  inﬂuence the gain
nd thereby symptom experiences. Scanning for signs of illness, for
xample, is a form of active inference, whereby the system selec-
ively samples sensory inputs with a view to conﬁrming its own
redictions (cf. “conﬁrmatory bias”). The precision of the signal
eing scanned for is relevant here, with the nature of the indi-
idual’s illness beliefs inﬂuencing where the gain is applied. If a
elatively precise threat is predicted, for example, then the per-
eption of signals that correspond to that threat will be optimized
making them more likely to become conscious). There will not be
 broader increase in gain on other units, and no lowering of inte-
oceptive thresholds more generally, unless the illness predictions
re more non-speciﬁc. This has clear implications for the choice of
timuli used in studies of attentional bias, which need to be tailored
o the particular beliefs of each participant.
It is important to note that in the current model, attention is
imply the process by which gain is applied to predictions and pre-
iction error units, increasing or decreasing their relative weight in
he perceptual process. Conscious contents, on the other hand, are
etermined by the generative model with the lowest overall pre-
iction error. By this view, there is a close correspondence between
hat is “attended to” (i.e., receives gain) and what the individual
s conscious of (as gain increases the likelihood of the model being
ptimal), but the two concepts are nevertheless separable (Hohwy,
012).
.4.3. Gender
One of the most consistent ﬁndings in this area is that women
eport more, more intense and more frequent symptoms than men,
 difference that remains after controlling for speciﬁc female gen-
er symptoms (Barsky et al., 2001). MUS, somatoform disorders and
unctional somatic syndromes are also consistently more preva-
ent in women than men  across clinical and non-clinical settings
e.g., Aamland et al., 2014; Kroenke and Spitzer, 1998; Wessely
t al., 1999; Cloninger et al., 1986). A wide variety of potentially
elated factors might account for this gender difference in symptom
eporting, including biological differences in nociception, exposure
o early adversity (Edwards et al., 2003), and neuroendocrine stress
esponses (Bartley and Fillingim, 2016; Doom et al., 2013). Gender-
elated differences in symptom appraisal, socialization processes
nd gender roles, as well as gender biases in research and clin-
cal practices, may  also account for some of the effect (Barsky
t al., 2001). However, two additional observations are impor-
ant in this respect: First, in laboratory environments, women  are
onsistently found to be less accurate than men  at detecting phys-
ological changes in, for example, heart rate, blood glucose, blood
ressure, respiration, and gastrointestinal sensations (Pennebaker
nd Roberts, 1992; Roberts and Pennebaker, 1994), which may  be
ue to gender-related structural and functional differences in the
nteroceptive network in the brain (Naliboff et al., 2003; Fairclough
nd Goodwin, 2007; Harshaw, 2015). Second, this laboratory differ-
nce in interoceptive accuracy disappears in natural environments,
hich may  be related to women being more sensitive to contex-
ual cues when determining their internal state (see Pennebaker
nd Roberts, 1992; Roberts and Pennebaker, 1994; Pennebaker,
995). An implication is that contextually driven priors are likelybehavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203
to have a greater inﬂuence on women’s interoception (and there-
fore symptom perception), while prediction errors resulting from
somatic input are more likely to inﬂuence men than women. This
perspective predicts that this will be more the case in conditions
where somatic input is less intense and/or localized, that is, where
there is more room for priors to impact symptom perception, which
is consistent with gender effects becoming typically evident in the
symptom ratings of healthy groups, and in assessments of MUS,
somatoform disorders, functional somatic syndromes and organic
pathology (Barsky et al., 2001). It also suggests that the gender dif-
ference will be more pronounced in somatic disease with a broader
range of low intensity symptoms than in acute conditions with
a smaller number of intense and localized symptoms, with this
difference becoming more pronounced over time as associations
between contextual factors and symptom episodes develop.
2.4.4. Threat and negative affect (NA)
Elevated physical symptom reporting is consistently associ-
ated with trait NA, as well as with anxiety states and affective
disturbance, regardless of whether objective disease is present.
Importantly, high NA appears to be a vulnerability factor for MUS
when it interacts with increased self-focused attention (Gendolla
et al., 2005), with previous experiences of somatic events and/or
with somatic concerns (Bogaerts et al., 2014; Van den Bergh et al.,
1997). As trait anxiety is associated with elevated sensitivity to
threat (Hariri, 2009; Yiend, 2010) and compromised inhibitory
systems for counter-regulating unpleasantness, it is likely that
these mechanisms are involved in the association between high
trait NA persons and MUS  (Bishop, 2009; Montoya et al., 2005;
Tillisch et al., 2011; Van Oudenhove and Aziz, 2013). Recently,
the concept of central sensitization has been advanced to capture
the idea of hyper-responsivity to various somatosensory stimuli
in patients with functional somatic syndromes, characterized by
elevated threat and salience detection, and a reduced capacity to
down-regulate emotional responses (Bourke et al., 2015; Nijs et al.,
2012 for reviews).
Greater activation of affective networks and compromised
inhibitory systems may generate augmented and imprecise inte-
roceptive prediction errors (i.e., a greater discrepancy between
predicted and actual interoceptive state; Paulus and Stein, 2006),
whilst inﬂuencing the likelihood of priors being activated that pre-
dict the presence of threat, including symptoms in MUS-prone
persons. Following Barrett and Bar (2009), we assume that the ‘gist’
of new stimuli are ﬁrst captured and used to create initial pre-
dictions as a basis for further processing. This process, thought to
be governed by the medial orbito-frontal cortex, instigates auto-
nomic and endocrine changes representing predictions about the
emotional and motivational signiﬁcance of the signal, allowing
stimuli to be categorized as either aversive, appetitive or neu-
tral, and facilitating object recognition and motivating rapid action
(e.g., approach, avoid) where appropriate. It also gives stimuli their
hedonic tone (i.e., whether, and to what extent, they are experi-
enced as pleasant or unpleasant; Barrett and Bar, 2009). Stimuli that
are characterized as potentially threatening or aversive at an early
stage are afforded processing priority (e.g., Robinson et al., 2013)
aimed at reducing the threat and thereby minimizing prediction
error.
At the point of initial threat categorization, generative models
are necessarily approximate: a detailed, contextually relevant gen-
erative model that accounts for the prediction errors follows later
and evolves over time (Barrett and Bar, 2009; Kveraga et al., 2007).
As such, the initial experience may  simply be one of an aversive
interoceptive experience associated with a non-speciﬁc sense that
“something is wrong”. Evidence suggests that one way of reduc-
ing ambiguity about the cause of this experience might be to alter
the sampling strategy (Barrett and Simmons, 2015), by reducing
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etailed sensory-perceptual processing of the prediction errors and
hifting the focus of representation to a simple categorization about
he nature of the threat. Consistent with this, a set of studies requir-
ng participants to categorize respiratory resistances of varying
ntensity levels (Petersen et al., 2014) found that anxious persons
howed poorer discrimination among within-category interocep-
ive stimuli and ﬁtted stimuli into categorical priors by taking less
ote of the variability resulting from sensory-discriminative pro-
essing (Procrustes effect; Petersen et al., submitted; Petersen et al.,
015a). Anxiety was also related to an increasing lack of differen-
iation between interoceptive stimuli over time, a generalization
rocess which may  serve to disambiguate stimuli in the short term,
ut lead to higher error feedback over time. In another study, high
nxious persons reporting high levels of symptoms in daily life mis-
lassiﬁed low respiratory resistances close to the category border
nto a high category, indicating a liberal criterion for identifying
timuli as symptoms consistent with a “better safe than sorry” strat-
gy (Petersen et al., 2015b). There is also evidence that anxiety
uring pain processing is associated with diminished perceptual
iscrimination of pain-related stimuli (Zaman et al., 2015).
Other studies in high trait NA persons with MUS showed
hat self-reported symptoms became less strongly related to
bjective indicators of physiological dysfunction (as induced by
O2-inhalation) when the latter was administered in a negative
ffective context. This effect only appeared when participants
ere asked to rate “symptoms” (e.g., dyspnea/breathlessness) and
ot when rating neutrally labelled “sensations” (e.g., breathing
ntensity), showing that a reduction in sensory-perceptual detail
s only applied when contextual cues advance symptom-related
riors (Bogaerts et al., 2005, 2008, 2010b). Less detailed sensory-
erceptual processing of somatic episodes in SSD patients may  also
nderlie the absence of a peak-end bias when evaluating previous
omatic episodes (Bogaerts et al., 2012) and less speciﬁc health-
elated autobiographical memories (Walentynowicz et al., 2016).
If detailed sensory-perceptual processing is reduced, intero-
eptive prediction errors will be imprecise, enabling high-level
riors to become potent biasing factors of somatic experiences.
here is evidence that patients with MUS  hold more precise pri-
rs about “a normal body condition” (Rief et al., 1998) and have
ower tolerance for uncertainty, leading to more prediction errors
nd thereby symptoms, especially when questioned about their
omatic state. Also chronic somatic concerns may  afford more
eight to symptom-related priors, reducing detailed sensory-
erceptual processing. This allows the prediction errors associated
ith negative affective states to be construed as somatic symptoms
hen conditions promote symptom-related priors, a ﬁnding that
as been observed consistently with high NA persons in a negative
ffective state (Bogaerts et al., 2010a; Constantinou et al., 2013).
ndeed, in a state of chronic uncertainty and stagnated error reduc-
ion, it may  be adaptive to take an inferential leap on the basis of
nsufﬁcient data, adopting a model that explains away somatosen-
ory prediction errors and paradoxically reduces the overall level of
hreat; in other words, it may  be better to know that you are ill than
o be unsure whether you are (i.e., “better the devil you know”).
hilst disambiguation may  serve a short term goal of reduced aver-
ive feedback, however, it sustains a high error rate in the long run;
he result is chronic negative affect and further attempts at dis-
mbiguation, expressed as chronic worry about the state (Carleton
t al., 2014) and the creation of a vicious circle that ultimately leads
o chronic MUS  and somatoform disorders.
.5. SummaryOne of the main advantages of the model described here is
hat it integrates research and theory from separate literatures −
hose on MUS  and those on symptom reporting more generally −behavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203 197
within a unifying framework that speciﬁes how symptoms come to
be perceived, and the conditions under which objective and sub-
jective health markers diverge. In this new model, the conscious
experience of a somatic symptom comes about as a result of the
continuous interplay between expectations and evidence where
speciﬁc factors and conditions specify the relative weight of both
sources of information in determining the eventual experience (see
Fig. 3).
An advantage of the model is that a categorical boundary
between MUS  and medically explained symptoms is replaced by
a process that allows gradual and context-dependent changes
in the relationship between objective health markers and self-
reported symptoms, and in which MUS  emerge as extreme (but
common) instances of this process. It also helps to understand how
symptoms that initially were closely linked to objective disease
indicators eventually may  become decoupled from it, why there
is a predominance of women  showing MUS, and why threat sen-
sitive individuals are more prone to develop MUS. The model also
describes several mechanisms contributing to the maintenance of
symptoms and their development into chronic complaints, which
are relevant regardless of how much the symptoms correspond to
objective disease indicators.
3. Implications
We conclude by brieﬂy highlighting some of the implications of
the model at different levels.
3.1. Theoretical implications
A central premise of this framework is that the brain can only
make sense of the world by being sensitive to statistical regularities
in its own neural activity. Moreover, how and how well we perceive
our internal state is always contextualized, that is, predicated on
speciﬁc factors within the person and context, meaning that the
“truthfulness” of perception is always relative. These aspects have
a number of important implications.
First, in order to understand MUS, the main issue may  not be
whether interoception is accurate or inaccurate, but why  and how
MUS  become valid (i.e., are adaptive) in a pragmatic sense (Petersen
et al., 2011). Whilst it is likely that adaptive models of the world
often correspond closely with regularities in the stimulation, less
accurate or even distorted models may  sometimes be more use-
ful if they are efﬁcient (i.e., minimize the amount of time and
energy needed to test them) and predict important events well
enough (Kruglanski, 1989; Lynn and Barrett, 2014). This highlights
the need for studies that test aspects of symptom perception such
as the precision of priors and the decision strategies used to clas-
sify sensations as noise or signal (i.e., “normal” or “symptom”). A
window into conﬁdence in perceptual hypotheses may  be offered
by intra-individual variance in the perception of the same stim-
ulus, as precision is the inverse of variability (inverse dispersion).
The perceiver may  or may  not be aware of this variance/conﬁdence,
however.
Second, contrary to the somatosensory ampliﬁcation model,
and perhaps common clinical wisdom, our account assumes that
there is no necessary relationship between interoceptive sensitiv-
ity as investigated in studies assessing detection thresholds for
interoceptive stimulation and symptom reports of physiological
dysfunction. Although sensitivity may  have a bearing on whether
a sensation reaches awareness, symptom perception and report-
ing is more a matter of classifying those sensations into categories
associated with threat. Context plays a crucial role in this process,
as predictions and their associated precision weights differ dra-
matically from one situation to the next. Counting heart beats in
198 O. Van den Bergh et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203
Fig. 3. A predictive coding approach to symptom perception. In contrast to the modal model of symptom perception (Fig. 1), within the predictive coding approach, the
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s  compared to this prior leading to a prediction error. As a result of error minimiz
rior  and the prediction error. The posterior serves as input determining the prior i
n experimental context is quite different, for example, from per-
eiving heart beats whilst walking up the stairs, having just read
 newspaper story about the sudden cardiac arrest and death of a
elebrity.
Third, moderators or individual risk factors for MUS, such as
A or gender, are not factors inﬂuencing a supervising agent (or
elf) that perceives the internal state, but contribute directly to per-
eption itself. Since interoception is a continuous process in which
ypotheses are tested and adapted in multiple trials, moderating
raits act as inherent characteristics of the algorithms underlying
he perceptual process and not as an external factor inﬂuencing
erception. Since the precision of prior distributions rather than
heir central tendency will affect information seeking and thereby
odel adjustment, a shift in research from means to the precision
f distributions is needed.
.2. Clinical implications
.2.1. Diagnostic implications
As the brain creates educated guesses about somatic stimu-
ation based on likelihoods, it is important to test not only the
nd-product of interoception (e.g., classiﬁcation of a sensation,
stimates of intensity, unpleasantness, location), but also the inte-
oceptive process itself. It could therefore be informative for health
are professionals to be able to assess the nature and precision
f their patients’ priors and the disambiguation and classiﬁcation
trategies they use in relation to interoceptive information. Several
eneﬁts may  emerge from developing the present perspective into
iagnostic strategies. First, if bias in interoception is not regarded
s “measurement error”, but as the patient’s best guess resulting
rom a speciﬁc mental model, this takes away any blame or stigma
owards them for being wrong in an absolute sense. Second, the
oundaries between normal and pathological cases would become
lurred because any symptom report can be disconnected from
bjective physiological indicators to some extent, depending on
he context and history of the person. This would at the same timetion based on previous symptom experience episodes). Any afferent sensory input
processes, a symptom experience (a posterior) is generated that best matches the
w symptom perception episode.
acknowledge the empirical evidence that MUS  vary in a dimen-
sional way  and occur in “objective disease” as well as in the absence
of it. Third, assessing mediating processes rather than end-products
points directly to intervention strategies, consistent with current
calls to move away from labels and categorical diagnoses and to
focus on transdiagnostic markers and processes (RDoC initiative,
Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). We believe that the development of diag-
nostic tools focusing on intra-individual variability in classifying
the same interoceptive stimulus, and on variations in disambigua-
tion and classiﬁcation strategies as a function of contextual cues,
may  provide valuable information in this respect.
3.2.2. Treatment implications
Following the modal models in this area, the dominant treat-
ment strategies involve the development of various self-help
techniques such as (1) reducing physiological arousal (e.g., through
relaxation); (2) altering interoceptive (hyper)vigilance; and (3)
correcting (catastrophic) misinterpretations of somatic sensations.
Studies of psychological treatments for MUS  in general show rela-
tively low effect sizes (Kleinstäuber et al., 2011; Van Dessel et al.,
2014) and there is much room for improvement. A major weak-
ness the somatosensory ampliﬁcation and signal ﬁltering models
have in common is that they do not ﬂesh out the process by which
conscious symptom experiences come about in the ﬁrst place. In
the present model, symptoms emerge in consciousness when the
generative model with the lowest overall prediction error and best
ratio of complexity and efﬁciency represents an interoceptive event
with an abnormal or disease cause. However, the processes and
interoceptive algorithms that lead to that experience are not avail-
able for introspection (i.e., are outside awareness), which results
in a strong and immediate feeling that one’s somatic experience
is trustworthy (“sensing is believing”). Since this process is the
same whether there is a close correlation with objective disease
indicators or not, it ﬁts with the perspective of the patient who
experiences no difference between MUS  and non-MUS symptoms.
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Breaking the “sensing is believing” cycle and encouraging the
ormation of new generative models may  require speciﬁc expe-
iences repeated over time. Interoceptive exposure therapy is
robably the most fruitful track to follow but the technique may
eed further ﬁne-tuning. In its present form it is intended to reduce
nteroceptive fear, that is, to reduce conﬁdence in the immediate
egative outcome of a sensation, which may  also implicitly increase
olerance for uncertainty. From the present perspective, however,
t is also necessary to reduce conﬁdence in the presence of a sen-
ation/symptom itself (sensing is believing) as well as to increase
he perceived heterogeneity of sensation and symptom categories.
o reduce implicit conﬁdence that a sensation is a symptom, train-
ng people to become more sensitive to differences in interoceptive
ensations may  be more helpful (Schaefer et al., 2014). This may  be
chieved by shifting the level of representation under conditions
f threat from affective-categorical to sensory-perceptual, thereby
educing the weight of the priors. Collectively these therapeutic
trategies might be termed “interoceptive differentiation training”.
.3. Translating the model into testable hypotheses
The model points to several obvious and important challenges
or research, including the independent assessment of priors, pre-
iction errors and their relative precisions at the neural levels,
ow they are inﬂuenced by contextual variables and individual
ifferences, and how they relate to behavioral processes. A more
eneral implication can be derived from the central assumption
n our approach, namely that the brain compresses information
nto classes that optimize the balance between redundancy and
oss of unique information (Chater and Vitányi, 2003; Seger and
eterson, 2013). This categorization process involves implicit infer-
nces about causes and consequences of the stimulation, resulting
rom the interplay between the distributions of priors and pre-
iction errors. This focus on distributions is different from the
raditional view that typically assesses mean values such as the
ocation of a sensation on a magnitude or unpleasantness scale, and
ends to consider intra-individual variance as measurement error.
n contrast, we suggest that variance is a valuable window into
onﬁdence, that is, into the precision of prior and posterior distri-
utions (deﬁning precision as inverse dispersion). Intra-individual
ariance can pertain to the same stimulus (ratings by one person
or one stimulus presented repeatedly to investigate the role of
ituational factors or dynamic changes over time) or to different
timuli (sensitivity for differences between interoceptive stimuli).
ntra-individual variance in processing complexity (i.e., the number
nd degree of independence of interoceptive dimensions involved
n stimulus evaluation) may  also provide useful information. For
xample, pain can be sharp and not dull, and dyspnea can feel
ore like air hunger than chest tightness. When category complex-
ty and inter-dimensional variance are reduced, categories become
ore inclusive (more sensations ﬁt the simpliﬁed prototype) and
isclassiﬁcation is more likely for symptom categories that are
epresented in this simpliﬁed fashion.
An example of this approach is a recent study in which a set of
quidistant respiratory resistances varying in intensity was admin-
stered to a group of healthy participants. Subsequently, the lower
esistances were artiﬁcially grouped into category A, and the higher
esistances were grouped into category B. Inducing these artiﬁ-
ial categories caused both assimilation and accentuation effects,
hat is, the perceived differences between stimuli within categories
ere suppressed while the differences between categories were
ccentuated (Petersen et al., 2014). These ﬁndings clearly illustrate
he role of interoceptive categories as priors.
Such methods may  reveal how contextual, state and trait-
elated individual difference variables change the processing
lgorithms underlying symptom perception. Some effects maybehavioral Reviews 74 (2017) 185–203 199
result from the relative impact of speciﬁc (types of) priors, while
other effects may  result from different sensitivities to detect
sensory-perceptual differences, or from implicitly used decision
strategies to classify sensations. For example, a recent study
showed that threat sensitivity is positively associated with the
degree to which interoceptive information processing is condensed
by assimilation and accentuation, and with a sense of increased
certainty about one’s classiﬁcations (Petersen et al., 2015b). The
curtailment of detailed sensory-perceptual processing and the
disambiguation of interoceptive information via assimilation and
accentuation (allowing for an inferential leap) could be regarded
as a quick and dirty categorization strategy that may be appropri-
ate if resources are low and/or the need for disambiguation (error
reduction) is high (e.g., a liberal “better safe than sorry” strategy;
see Petersen et al., 2015b; supra).
These are just a few examples of how the present perspec-
tive suggests novel research methods for studying interoceptive
processing and symptom perception, shedding new light on how
symptom experiences relate to objective bodily events.
4. Summary and conclusions
The basic assumption underlying the model presented here is
that the brain makes sense of the internal state of the body by
being sensitive to statistical regularities in its own  neural activity.
It does this by compressing information into categories in a par-
simonious way, optimizing the balance between redundancy and
loss of unique information, in order to form mental representa-
tions of the bodily state. These representations (generative models)
exist at multiple hierarchical levels and are continuously shaped
and reﬁned by mapping neural activity representing prior expec-
tations onto incoming afferent activity. This inferential process
eventually results in abstract categorical representations reaching
awareness, for example, in the form of consciously felt pain, weak-
ness or breathlessness. We  propose that consciously experienced
symptoms reﬂect the generative model with the lowest overall pre-
diction error representing an interoceptive event with an abnormal
(typically disease) cause. Depending on speciﬁc conditions, the per-
cept of the body may  be more inﬂuenced by prior expectations or
by actual inputs (prediction errors).
We conclude by listing what we  consider to be the major
strengths of the model. First, the dynamic interplay between pri-
ors and prediction errors at multiple hierarchical levels results in
a dimensional variation of the relationship between subjectively
experienced physical symptoms and objective physical dysfunc-
tion. This is consistent with a wealth of evidence showing that the
strength of this relationship varies enormously in organic disease;
importantly, it accommodates MUS  within the same framework,
placing them at the extreme end of this dimension. Future work
may  consider how other seemingly anomalous phenomena, such
as placebo, nocebo, phantom limb pain, and hypnotic effects could
be understood using a similar framework (Büchel et al., 2014).
One consequence of this approach is that medicine, in order to
become truly patient-focused, needs to go beyond the biopsy-
chosocial perspective and embrace a symptom perception model.
Second, the relationship between the experience of physical symp-
toms and objective physical dysfunction is always contextualized,
that is, inﬂuenced by speciﬁc factors within the historical person,
the context, and their interaction. This means that the relation-
ship between symptoms and physiological dysfunction may  vary
substantially both within-person and within-situation. Third, the
model de-emphasizes the importance of “accuracy” in symptom
perception and promotes the importance of understanding its
validity and utility in a pragmatic sense. This shift in emphasis
has important theoretical and clinical consequences. Fourth, clin-
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cal intervention should more explicitly target those inferential
rocesses leading to the phenomenal experience of symptoms as
really there”. Fifth, and most importantly, a predictive coding
ramework may  suggest novel behavioral paradigms as well as
ew measurement parameters for testing critical predictions. By
xtending these approaches to include neurobiological paradigms,
e hope to provide an antidote to a narrow disease model and the
nhelpful separation of psyche and soma.
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